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Abstract 
As the rush to understand and find solutions to the COVID-19 pandemic continues, it is timely 
to re-examine the legal, social and ethical drivers for sharing health-related data from 
individuals around the globe. International collaboration and data sharing will be essential to 
the research effort. This raises the question of whether the urgent imperative to find 
therapies and vaccines may justify some temporary rebalancing of existing ethical and 
regulatory standards. The Global Alliance for Genomic Health is playing a leading role in 
collecting information about national approaches to these challenging questions. In this 
article, we examine some of the initiatives being taken in Australia against this global 
backdrop.  
1 Introduction 
It goes without saying to the readership of the Journal of Law and Medicine that the COVID-
19 pandemic is raising (and exacerbating) a host of ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI). Yet 
despite the obviousness of this statement, the mechanisms for deciding on appropriate 
responses are far from clear. Given the global reach of the pandemic, whatever strategies are 
developed must be similarly global in reach, but they must also give appropriate 
consideration of local conditions. Not least amongst the multitude of ELSI is the question of 
how to facilitate appropriate sharing of health-related data collected from individuals, in 
order to maximise the potential for rapid development of therapies and vaccines. In addition 
to data on hospitalisation, treatment, and other health records, genomic data is likely to be 
particularly pertinent to the research effort seeking to explore differential responses to the 
infection, and to the various treatment options and vaccines that are starting to be trialled.1  
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The concept of data sharing is not a new one for many scientific disciplines.2 In the context of 
genomic research, in particular, data sharing has been broadly embraced by researchers from 
the start of the Human Genome Project,3 through to more recent times.4 The need for 
engagement in open data sharing is likely to become more critical in the particular context of 
public health emergencies. This need is well articulated by the Wellcome Trust in its 
Statement on Data Sharing in Public Health Emergencies: ‘In the context of a public health 
emergency of international concern, there is an imperative on all parties to make any 
information available that might have value in combatting the crisis.’5 In relation to the 
COVID-19 outbreak, the Wellcome Trust has been forthright in its call for open data sharing: ‘We call 
on researchers, journals and funders to ensure that research findings and data relevant 
to this outbreak are shared rapidly and openly to inform the public health response and 
help save lives.’6  
Notwithstanding the clear benefits in ensuring that genomic and other health data are shared 
as openly as possible, particularly in the context of public health emergencies, there is a long 
history of debate associated with the ELSI that such sharing raises, particularly when it 
involves highly sensitive and potentially identifiable health or genomic information. It has 
been well recognised from the start of the genomics revolution that data sharing and other 
aspects of these ‘big science’ initiatives raise particular ELSI, demanding scrutiny of the 
adequacy of existing regulatory and ethical instruments, both nationally and internationally. 
Now, more than ever, the volume and variety of data that can be collected, stored, linked, 
shared and analysed is pushing the boundaries of available ethical and regulatory 
frameworks.  
Policy makers, governments, funding agencies, research organisations and others all 
recognise the data sharing imperative, but also the need for appropriate and adequate ethical 
and regulatory responses. Such recognition was the genesis of the Global Alliance for 
Genomic Health (GA4GH) in 2013. The Australian Genomic Health Alliance mirrors the work 
of the GA4GH at the local Australian level.7 Other research groups are focusing particular 
attention on the Australian ethical and regulatory requirements for data sharing, including 
our own Centre for Law and Genetics (CLG).  
The COVID-19 public health emergency demands assessment of the adequacy and 
appropriateness of our current data sharing norms. As emphasized by the GA4GH executive: 
‘An effective and equitable response to the COVID-19 pandemic requires rapid and sustained 
international collaboration and data sharing.’8 This, likewise, demands further consideration 
of the adequacy of existing ethical and regulatory standards, and the extent to which the 
urgent imperative to find therapies and vaccines may justify relaxation of some of these 
standards, should this be necessary. In response, the GA4GH Regulatory and Ethics Working 
Group has developed a perspective statement: Responsible Data Sharing to Respond to the 
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COVID-19 Pandemic: Ethical and Legal Considerations.9 This is an iterative document, in 
version 2.0 at the time of writing. The CLG team provided feedback to the first version of the 
GA4GH statement, with particular focus on the Australian situation.  
This feedback informs this article, the purpose of which is to provide a summary of the 
regulatory and ethical responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in Australia, and position these 
within the broader global data sharing movement. This article provides a brief background on 
the ELSI of globalised data sharing of genomic and related health data before considering key 
aspects of the ethical and regulatory environment within which responses to the challenges 
flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic are situated. We focus on privacy and data protection, 
regulation of medical devices, intellectual property issues, data sharing initiatives and public 
health and research ethics. We note that it is not yet possible to fully evaluate the adequacy 
of these responses in the national and global contexts. Recognising it is only with the passage 
of time that it will be possible to do so, it is important to keep a watching brief on these 
developments in the interim. 
2 Regulatory and ethical challenges in a globalised data sharing environment  
Rapid innovation in genomic and other health-related technologies has yielded an 
exponential growth in data. Widespread data sharing, including across national borders, is 
becoming an essential component of clinical and research practice.10 There is evidence of this 
new wave of health-related data improving clinical care, with precision medicine offering 
targeted treatments tailored to the individual patient’s genetic characteristics and medical 
history.11 
In Australia, as in other countries, legal requirements (for example, privacy laws, intellectual 
property rights and data transfers executed through formal means), and quasi-legal 
requirements (for example, research ethics obligations), may potentially limit free and open 
data sharing. At the same time, these requirements may collectively provide the assurances 
necessary to protect donors, encourage research and innovation, and promote ongoing 
public trust in data sharing activities. A central question is whether the ELSI associated with 
the movement towards data sharing can be addressed within existing regulatory and 
governance frameworks or whether new regulatory responses are required.  
A range of considerations must be taken into account in tackling these complex issues. Given 
that data is shared across borders, regulations must consider international dimensions and, 
where possible, strive for global harmonisation without weak links in the regulatory chain. 
Roger Brownsword has articulated four key themes around which these regulatory responses 
should be evaluated: community acceptance and legitimacy; operational effectiveness; 
connection to the inevitable changes in data sharing and in the science itself; and 
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cosmopolitanism.12  Rights, responsibilities and stewardship need to be reviewed in this fluid, 
changing and global environment.13  
Whilst there are similarities in regulatory frameworks between jurisdictions, there are also 
some significant differences. For example, data protection and privacy laws may meet 
Brownsword’s cosmopolitanism, but are not internationally uniform, nor are judicial attitudes 
to their interpretation. These challenges are compounded by the General Data Protection 
Directive (GDPR) in Europe which entered into force in May 2018. The extent to which GDPR 
obligations are imposed on Australian researchers and clinicians who share data with their 
counterparts in Europe remains an open question. 
Self-regulation by researcher and research institutions is an option for achieving international 
harmonization, potentially avoiding some of the cross-border challenges that national laws 
pose for data sharing activities. As noted on the GA4GH website, it was established ‘to realize 
the full potential of genetic and clinical data[sets] in research’ and facilitate broader benefits 
from genomic big data by establishing a common international framework to facilitate data 
collection, management and sharing in an ‘effective, responsible and interpretable manner’.  
 In 2014, the GA4GH published a Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-
Related Data, containing core elements for participant-patient consent, legally and ethically 
compliant data access and governance and sanction mechanisms. The idea behind this 
common framework of harmonized approaches is that it will ‘enable effective and responsible 
sharing of genomic and clinical data and … catalyze data sharing projects that drive and 
demonstrate the value of data sharing’.14 Voluntary standards, such as those set out in the 
GA4GH Framework, can thus ‘regulate’ the platforms required for international 
collaborations in large-scale genomic research and policy development.15   
Through its Regulatory and Ethics Workstream16 and Regulatory and Ethics Toolkit,17 the 
GA4GH is well placed to respond to public health emergencies requiring urgent action. The 
GA4GH has taken a lead in starting the discussion on the ethical and legal considerations in 
responsible data sharing in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In exploring these 
questions, the GA4GH’s perspective statement identifies five key areas for analysis, which we 
synthesise into the following five questions. We examine the Australian responses to each of 
these issues in the next section:  
• Privacy and data protection. Recognising that many jurisdictions allow processing of 
data for public health purposes, what conditions should be imposed on such uses, and 
when might these conditions be relaxed? 
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• Intellectual property. What measures may be taken to ensure intellectual property 
does not unduly restrict the development of treatments and vaccines, while still 
providing the incentive to innovate? 
• Medical devices. How can approval of medical devices for therapeutic use be 
expedited, whilst ensuring safety and efficacy? 
• Data sharing. What are the appropriate limits on sharing, and what should 
governments be asking of their citizens? 
• Ethics. How is justice, the bedrock of public health ethics, maintained, and how is 
timely, but thorough review of research ethics assured in circumstances of extreme 
urgency? 
3 Regulatory and ethical frameworks in the context of COVID-19 – Australian 
responses 
Australia, like the USA and a number of other countries, is a federation, and has a health-care 
system with a mix of state and territory-based and national providers, as well as a mix of 
public and private providers. There has been a concerted national response to this pandemic, 
with the closure of borders at the national as well as state and territory levels, quarantine 
measures, carrier contact tracing and social distancing requirements. This national response 
has extended to integrated health-care responses to emergency services, hospital care and 
testing, principally in the public sector. Importantly, research and the search for a vaccine is 
situated within this national response, and linked with international research.  
3.1 Privacy and data protection 
State and national privacy laws are some of the most pressing legal barriers to widespread 
data sharing. Privacy concerns are inevitably raised whenever personal health data is 
accessed and used for secondary purposes, especially where this traverses different 
regulatory frameworks, with potential flow-on effects for public trust.18 Privacy and security 
issues are especially acute in the context of genomic data, given its unique qualities: 
ubiquitous, permanent and unalterable, and potentially re-identifiable even when de-
identified.19 Genomic data tests the distinctions between personal and non-personal 
information, which could potentially lead to unnecessary restrictions for clinical practice and 
medical research and consequent impact on patient care.  
There are fundamental tensions between individualistic conceptions of personal privacy and 
relational views of information sharing,20 creating a schism between researchers and 
technology companies who may argue for ‘free’ data-sharing for the benefits of science and 
medicine, and privacy advocates fearing misuse of personal information and discrimination.21 
Ultimately, privacy is not individualistic but contextual and relational, and ideas of public 
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good, as well as personal good, must be considered.22 The core challenge is to balance privacy 
interests with society’s legitimate interest in benefiting from scientific advances.  
This privacy challenge warrants detailed reevaluation in the context of public health 
emergencies, where the immediate need for granular data tests traditional tools for privacy 
protection, such as notice, consent and de-identification. As with many other countries, 
Australia is actively participating in the global response to the current emergency, within the 
context of its own ethical, legal and regulatory environment. The Australian Information 
Commissioner is a member of the Executive Committee of the Global Privacy Assembly, which 
has issued a statement expressing their confidence that ‘data protection requirements will 
not stop the critical sharing of information to support efforts to tackle this global pandemic’.23  
Also, bearing in mind Australia’s mix of federal and state and territory privacy laws, all privacy 
regulators have collectively formed a National COVID-19 Privacy Team.24 As noted in the 
Australian privacy regulators’ response to COVID-19, Australian privacy laws allow the use of 
personal information in circumstances such as these, provided that the use is reasonably 
necessary and the information is protected from inappropriate disclosure.25 It should further 
be noted, however, that where the intended use is for the purpose of health research and it 
is impracticable to obtain individual consent, not only must the information be protected 
from inappropriate disclosure, but the use must be approved by a Human Research Ethics 
Committee. This provides an added layer of protection for research participants and patients 
where rapid responses are necessary, while still allowing research in the public interest to 
proceed.  
3.2 Intellectual property 
Institutional and individual researcher engagement in data sharing may create legal barriers 
to widespread dissemination. Although open access to research data is broadly accepted as 
an underlying norm of science, it can be in tension with national and institutional policies 
directed towards engagement with industry and protection of intellectual property.  
Australia has provisions in its Patents Act 1990 (Cth) allowing use of patented subject matter 
without the authorisation of the patent holder.  There are two ways that this can be achieved. 
The first is through compulsory licensing, which requires application by the proposed 
compulsory licensee to the Federal Court of Australia. Such applicants are exceptionally rare. 
The second is the long-standing provision for the Australian government to step in and rely 
on ‘Crown use’ to use patented technology ‘for the services of the state’, or to licence other 
providers to do the same. Again, this provision is rarely utilised, though it remains available 
should the need arise.  
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Notably, in February 2020, this Crown use provision was significantly amended, and now 
explicitly includes a provision allowing Crown exploitation in emergencies.26 The trigger for 
Crown exploitation in emergencies is that the relevant Minister considers that the 
exploitation is required, and approves in writing, the exploitation before the exploitation 
starts. Unlike the general Crown exploitation provisions, previous attempts at negotiating a 
licence with the patent holder are not required, although just and reasonable remuneration 
is necessary. Although this amendment to Australian patent law was not triggered by the 
COVID-19 emergency, it certainly provides a clearer route to use without authorisation of the 
patent holder, should this be necessary. It aligns with provisions in many other jurisdictions. 
The governments of other countries have actively endorsed reliance on equivalent provisions 
in their patent legislation. These include Germany, Israel, Chile and Canada.27 Notably, Canada 
has enacted legislation to give specific effect to its compulsory licensing provisions in the 
context of COVID-19. Part 12 of the COVID-19 Emergency Response Act 2020 requires that 
‘the Commissioner of Patents, on the application of the Minister of Health, authorize the 
Government of Canada and any person specified in the application to make, construct, use 
and sell a patented invention to the extent necessary to respond to a public health emergency 
that is a matter of national concern’. One risk here, however, is that if the patent incentive is 
curtailed to too great an extent, product developers may choose to rely on trade secrecy.  
An alternative is to rely on the goodwill of patent holders to voluntarily engage in open 
licensing of their intellectual property rights, either for the purpose of fulfilling their 
commitment to corporate social responsibility, or for political expediency, or perhaps more 
likely, a combination of both. The WHO has been proactive in this area, including its 
endorsement of a proposal by the Costa Rican government to establish a voluntary patent 
pool.28 Separately, the newly formed Open COVID Coalition is calling for widespread 
commitment to its Open COVID pledge: ‘to make our intellectual property available free of 
charge for use in ending the COVID-19 pandemic and minimizing the impact of the 
disease.’29 The pledge is accompanied by an Open COVID licence. To date there appears to be 
no Australian involvement in either initiative, although one commentator has expressed  
some scepticism, querying the breadth of the COVID licence.30 
3.3 Medical devices 
In Australia, the relevant body for approving the therapeutic use of medical devices is the 
Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA). The Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) required that 
any product for which therapeutic claims are made must be entered in the Australian Register 
of Therapeutic Goods (ARTG) before the product can be supplied in Australia. The ARTG is a 
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computer database of information about therapeutic goods for human use approved for 
supply in, or exported from, Australia. The Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) and subordinate 
regulations, orders and specifications set out the requirements for inclusion of therapeutic 
goods in the ARTG, including advertising, labelling, product appearance and appeal 
guidelines. Medical devices are included in this regulatory regime, and the Therapeutic Goods 
(Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) provides detailed procedural requirements for their 
registration. There are four classes of devices, from class 1 (for such devices as surgical 
retractors and tongue depressors) to higher classes for heart valves, hip replacements, 
defibrillators and the like. A conformity assessment procedure ensures that devices conform 
to requirements for that class. Higher classes require a higher level of conformity. 
Diagnostic tests are included in the medical devices regime as in vitro devices (IVDs), which 
are separated into three categories: ‘IVD medical devices’, ‘in-house IVD medical devices’ and 
‘IVD medical devices for self-testing’. The IVD medical device category is most relevant in the 
context of COVID-19, since it covers IVDs manufactured in Australia or manufactured 
elsewhere and imported into Australia. In light of the massive increase in demand for COVID-
19 diagnostic tests, the TGA has to date created two processes to facilitate the supply COVID-
19 tests (recognising that further changes may be made in the future):31 
 (a) expedited assessment of tests for inclusion on the Australian Register of 
Therapeutic Goods (ARTG). Once approved for inclusion on the ARTG, the COVID-19 
test can be legally supplied in Australia; and 
 (b) an emergency exemption to allow immediate supply of COVID-19 diagnostic tests 
to accredited pathology laboratories.32  
These steps are similar to those taken in other jurisdictions, and have assisted in ensuring that 
Australia’s response to testing in the COVID-19 landscape has conformed with best practice.  
3.4 Data sharing 
A significant aspect of international responses to this pandemic, as to all pandemics, is the 
process of carrier contact tracing, which inevitably raises privacy concerns. The introduction 
of the national ‘COVIDSafe app’ designed to automate contact tracing for people exposed to 
coronavirus has been generally supported, but not without reservations. This app uses 
Bluetooth technology to detect and alert people who have come into contact with someone 
infected with the virus. In response to concerns about privacy breaches, it was announced 
early, while the app was still under development, that adoption of the app would be voluntary 
but strongly encouraged as an important measure to facilitate easing of restrictions.  
At the time of writing, over 5 million Australians had downloaded the COVIDSafe app. To 
enhance public confidence in the app, the federal government has augmented existing 
privacy protection in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (including that use of data must be confined 
to the purpose for which it was collected) by introducing legislation to govern the use of data 
collected via the COVIDSafe app.33 The Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact 
Information) Act 2020 (Cth) creates a number of offences punishable by imprisonment 
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including for any person collecting, using, or disclosing COVID app data other than in 
accordance with the legislation as well as any person decrypting COVID app data.  
Australia’s tracing response to the COVID-19 pandemic is mirrored by actions taken in 
Singapore and South Korea. South Korea’s success in containing COVID-19 pandemic without 
imposing a lockdown has been largely attributed to their extensive tracing as well as 
surveillance of its citizens. Interventions by government focused on addressing the pandemic 
have raised questions about the long term effects of such measures which involve 
unprecedented use by governments and health care bodies of sensitive patient data.34 
Concerns about privacy are real but are currently being overtaken by the widespread desire 
to save lives and end lockdowns.  
These developments have highlighted the vital role of community and public trust, 
particularly trust in government and public health authorities during a pandemic. This trust 
will be tested when the pandemic is under control. It is in this context that the new Australian 
legislation provides for the deletion of all COVID app data from the National COVIDSafe Data 
Store after the official end of the pandemic.35 This provision provides that the personal data 
will be deleted and no longer shared.  
3.5  Public health and research ethics 
3.5.1 Public health policy and public health ethics 
Although there has not yet been a specific response to the drive towards greater data sharing 
in the context of public health policy and public health ethics, this issue is integral to broader 
public health policy and public health ethics debates. The public health response to COVID-
19 in Australia has been marked by strong collaboration and co-ordination between federal 
and state and territory governments. In February 2020, an Australian Health Sector 
Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19) was released to guide the 
Australian health sector response.36 The federal Department of Health has issued a series of 
national guidelines,37 which have been developed in consultation with the Communicable 
Diseases Network Australia and endorsed by the Australian Health Protection Principal 
Committee. Their purpose is to provide nationally consistent advice and guidance to public 
health units in responding to a notifiable disease event.  
The guidelines include recommendations for surveillance, infection control, laboratory 
testing and contact management for COVID-19. The federal government has also developed 
a range of resources for health professionals, including aged care providers, pathology 
providers and health care managers, about coronavirus (COVID-19).38 These initiatives have 
been accompanied by stringent restrictions on business activity, quarantine and social 
distancing requirements, and mobility restrictions, including border closures and curtailing 
free movement within jurisdictions - all potentially raising legal and ethical issues. Whilst 
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governments clearly have a responsibility to adopt preventive measures to protect the 
population from exposure to COVID-19 there is potential for tension between the priority of 
protecting public health and ensuring respect for human rights.39  
Various international agencies have called for a transparent and measured approach in 
national responses to ensure minimisation of the inevitable impacts on the rights and 
freedoms of individuals.40 Although ‘unprecedented’ in the nature and scale of interference 
with public and private activity, including an enormous impact on the economy and significant 
social impacts, there has been strong community compliance with these measures 
contributing to Australia’s efforts to ‘flatten the curve’ of infections. The issue of community 
compliance with crisis directives, including mobility restrictions and social distancing 
requirements, has been a major concern in the public, political and expert debates on the 
effectiveness of national responses as measures to counter COVID-19 can only be effective if 
target populations follow instructions and abide by rules. In contrast to other jurisdictions, 
such as the USA and Germany, there has been relatively little organised opposition to these 
measures. Particularly taking into account the federated nature of Australia and the potential 
for division and tension between jurisdictions, the collaborative governmental approach with 
the creation of a National Cabinet (including state and territory leaders) to spearhead the 
Australian response, appears to have been relatively successful as a public policy exercise.    
3.5.2 Research ethics 
Regulation of data sharing activities is inextricably intertwined with research ethics codes and 
practices governing the conduct of research in Australia and overseas. Approval from human 
research ethics committees (HRECs) provides a means of ensuring that research is only 
conducted where it has met threshold standards of acceptability, and is a legal requirement 
for any waiver of consent for the use of personal health information held by Australian 
Government agencies or private organisations for research. However, review processes also 
can impose considerable barriers. Multi-centre research requires approval from multiple 
HRECs, often operating in different countries with somewhat different review requirements. 
Although HRECs tend to follow similar procedures, this does not necessarily mean that they 
make consistent decisions, even when reviewing the same project based on the same 
criteria.41 This could slow the approval process for urgently needed research.  
The human research ethics system in Australia is administered by the National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHMRC). The NHMRC has reminded us:  
Compliance with or adherence to regulations, guidelines, codes, policies and other 
standards remains necessary. However, interpretation of research responsibilities in 
the context of a crisis such as COVID-19 should be informed by flexibility, consultation 
and good sense so as to retain the focus on the safety and well-being of those most at 
risk in our institutions and communities.42 
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There may be some advantage in streamlining the ethics review process, both immediately in 
response to the COVID-19 emergency, and in the longer term to facilitate research—a process 
already commenced in Australia through the National Mutual Acceptance Scheme. However, 
this should not in any way suggest that reviews should be less robust than reviews conducted 
in non-pandemic times - rapid response need not mean lighter touch. As the executive of the 
GA4GH have pointed out in an open letter: ‘… in order to ensure truly equitable access to and 
participation in both the scientific process and its benefits, we must rigorously maintain 
technical and ethical standards that support the open sharing of data and knowledge—now 
and always.’43 
Conclusion 
This is a brief overview of some of the more significant current developments in Australia 
designed to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic in ways that facilitate research and 
encourage open data sharing, while protecting patients, research participants and the 
community at large.  
As alluded to earlier in this article, public trust is vital in public responses to pandemics. Pre 
pandemic research, including our own, suggests that Australians are wary of sharing their 
genomic information yet realise the significant benefits that could arise.44 Concerns around 
privacy, equity in relation to access of developed treatments, lack of control over the future 
use of information and profiteering from altruistic donations are common concerns that are 
juxtaposed with a desire to help others and contribute to scientific knowledge.  
Preliminary results from the latest Swinburne National Technology and Society Monitor 
(SNTSM) in Australia suggest the tension between concern and the desire to help have been 
attenuated by the pandemic.45 The survey of 978 members of the Australian public 
undertaken at the height of the pandemic (in April 2020) suggests that people are significantly 
more likely to accept an easing of restrictions on sharing medical information with both 
private and public research organisations during, compared to after the pandemic. 
Acceptance was also equally high both during and after the pandemic for strategies aimed at 
ensuring that patents do not interfere with vaccine development, and that if a vaccine is 
developed it is freely available to all. This survey, together with our earlier work, illustrates 
the high level of public support for the research effort aimed at finding solutions to otherwise 
intractable healthcare problems. It also illustrates that, during public health emergencies, 
people are prepared to accept some relaxation of privacy and other protections, but that this 
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is conditional on a range of factors. In particular, once the immediate emergency is over, 
these relaxations will need to be revisited.   
It is widely acknowledged that the post COVID-19 world will not be the same as pre COVID-
19. We should therefore consciously be planning, through enhanced collaborative efforts, to 
take the best of the lessons learned and the new approaches developed during this time to 
inform our practices for the future. We should also have strategies in place to ensure that 
community voices are heard in our planning for the future. In the time of COVID-19, and 
pandemics generally, we should be equally committed to our ethical values and protective of 
civil liberties to ensure that all restrictions on those values and liberties are justified, 
reviewable and temporary.  
 
